New Delhi, August 14, 2025 – Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will arrive in New Delhi on August 18, 2025, for a critical round of talks with India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval under the Special Representatives mechanism to address the India-China boundary dispute. This high-level visit, the first
since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, both the nations seek to build on recent progress made in disengaging troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and navigate a complex relationship marked by trade dependencies, regional tensions, and the growing strategic weight of BRICS and SCO amid U.S. trade pressures.
The talks follow Doval’s invitation to Wang during their June 2025 meeting in Beijing, signaling a mutual intent to stabilize ties strained over the past five years.
The primary agenda of Wang’s visit is the 23rd round of Special Representatives talks, dormant since December 2019, focusing on maintaining peace along the 3,488-km LAC after the October 2024 disengagement agreement resolved tensions at friction points like Depsang and Demchok. The agreement restored pre-2020 patrolling arrangements, marking a breakthrough in a standoff that began with the deadly 2020 Galwan clash, which claimed 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops.
Within a month of Doval-Wang Yi meeting, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met Chinese Foreign Minister in Beijing during the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Jaishankar emphasized peace along the Line of Actual Control as the “fundamental basis” for ties, urging sustained de-escalation and better border management. Wang Yi, marking 75 years of diplomatic ties, said, “China-India relations should not be disrupted by any third party,” advocating for mutual respect. Both agreed to enhance people-to-people ties, with Jaishankar welcoming the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and pushing for direct flights and relaxed travel curbs. The meeting paved the way for Wang’s Delhi visit on which aims to advance border talks and cooperation.
India-China relations have been turbulent since 2020, with the Galwan clash prompting India to ban over 200 Chinese apps, tighten scrutiny of Chinese investments, and suspend cultural exchanges, including the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage. Twenty-one rounds of Corps Commander-level talks yielded partial disengagements by 2023, but key areas remained unresolved until last year’s agreement. Signs of normalization in the bilateral ties have emerged, with India resuming tourist visas for Chinese nationals in July 2025 and both countries planning to restart direct passenger flights in September 2025, halted since the COVID-19 pandemic.
During India’s Operation Sindoor in early 2025, targeting terrorist networks along the India-Pakistan border, Delhi reported Pakistan’s use of Chinese-made weapons and drones, with Beijing allegedly providing live intelligence to Rawalpindi. India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated on February 10, 2025, “External support to Pakistan’s military actions undermines regional stability.” China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian countered on February 12, 2025, saying, “China’s cooperation with Pakistan is transparent and aimed at regional security.” This incident has created unease in the bilateral ties which seemed poised for some normalcy after years of lull.
However recent US tariff on India and Washington-Rawalpindi closeness expressed overtly by both the side has once again reminded Indian diplomats of US’s unpredictability and decades long preference for Pakistani Military as an ally at the expense of India. and sent policymakers scrambling alternative partnerships. Indian Prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent call to Russian President Putin and Brazilian President Lula De Silva is also being seen in this context.
The U.S.’s aggressive trade posture, with tariffs on Indian goods rising to 50% in 2025 over India’s Russian oil purchases, has elevated the importance of BRICS and SCO. BRICS, with $32 billion in New Development Bank projects by 2025, and the SCO, where India prioritizes counter-terrorism, offer platforms for India and China to counter Western economic dominance. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s refusal to endorse the SCO joint declaration in June 2025 over terrorism concerns underscores India’s priorities. Jaishankar noted in July 2025, “BRICS and SCO are vital for India to engage with like-minded nations and ensure a multipolar world.” Wang Yi, in July 2025, called for “China and India to adhere to good-neighborliness, finding a way for mutual respect and win-win cooperation.”As Wang Yi arrives in Delhi, the talks with Doval will test whether both nations can sustain border disengagement and advance de-escalation while addressing trade and regional challenges.
With Modi’s SCO visit looming, this engagement could set the tone for a pragmatic partnership, though India remains wary of China’s regional actions. Jaishankar’s November 2024 remark, “India and China must move forward on mutual respect and strategic pragmatism,” encapsulates the delicate balance both sides seek to strike.